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 Remittances and credit markets:
Complementarities and evidence
from Senegal
In markets that lack access to formal ﬁnancial
institutions, remittance ﬂows and credit
can serve as complementary resource
channels to help alleviate the impact of
shocks to households. This blog looks at the
effect of remittance ﬂows on credit access
for households in rural Senegal.
Remittances are crucial to many developing countries and in
particular in sub-Saharan Africa. International migrants’
transfers are estimated at USD 40 billion, representing 2.6% of
Africa’s GDP in 2010. In Senegal, remittances represent 9.3%
of the GDP and are one of the main resources for the country.
Credit markets are also very important for developing
countries. However, the proportion of formal loans remains
low due to many barriers, such as a lack of collateral provided
by borrowers. In my recent AfDB working paper I offer a new
contribution to the literature on the impact of migrants’
remittance transfers on rural credit markets. More precisely, I
make the assumption that although remittances are substitutes
to credit market imperfections, migrants’ transfers and loans
can also be complementary.
Remittances and credit markets can be complementary
Migrants can increase the likelihood that their relatives can
secure a loan. Remittance flows offer an alternative means of
repayment, in the event that a household experiences a shock.
They play the role of collateral by being the “third element” or
the “element of trust” in the credit contract between a borrower
and a lender. This role of trust is explained by the level of
information asymmetry between the parties.
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In rural areas, information asymmetries can be low because
most of the loans are informal and the lender knows whether a
borrower has a migrant in his household. It is also very likely
that the lender knows the characteristics or ‘ability’ of this
migrant. Consequently, migrants can act as a signal of the
reliability of their borrowing family members.
Migrants also provide collateral in the form of household risk-
sharing, particularly in the event of a community-wide (or
covariate) shock. Without access to insurance markets, risk-
within the same community is difficult, and households must
rely on arrangements outside the community. Subsequently, the
level of information asymmetry is higher when borrowers and
lenders do not belong to the same network. Even in this case, I
argue that because of their remittances, migrants make the
borrowers left-behind less likely to default and thus more
reliable.
remittances can help expand households’ access to
credit markets, rather than being used after the fact to
help repay loans. ”
Measuring the effects of remittances
To better understand the impact that remittance flows might
have on a household’s access to credit, I test the statistical
strength and validity of the relationship between remittances
and credit markets using an ordinary least square regression
(OLS). To identify the causal impact of remittances however,
any regression results have to overcome a few basic statistical
challenges, including: endogeneity and reverse causality. Simply
put, endogeneity could mean there is the possibility of some
selection bias, whereby households that opt to have members
migrate for work are in some intrinsic way distinct from
households that do not migrate. This also suggests that there
are, potentially unobservable, household characteristics that
affect a household’s credit outcomes, and that remittances
cannot fully explain credit market effects. Reverse causality
would imply that while remittances can enable households to
access to credit, they might also be sent to repay loans.
Moreover, loans can fund migration for one or several
household members and thus explain the following receipt of
remittances.
To address these concerns, I use a household fixed effects
model. This allows me to control for selection effects and
potentially unobservable time invariant characteristics of
households in the sample. I also control for the potential reverse
causality by applying an instrumental variable approach. As an
instrument for remittances, I use distance from a village to the
harbour of Dakar which represents the exogenous cost of
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harbour of Dakar which represents the exogenous cost of
migration between 1900 and 1960 when the first Senegalese
migrants’ networks were formed.
This approach relies on the long migration history of Senegal
and the role of the harbour of Dakar, in setting up historical
migration networks. The harbour was built in 1866 during the
time of French colonialism era and played an important role in
the development of the city of Dakar, which attracted internal
migrants. At the same time, due to its strategic location, it also
played a role in international migration from Senegal to other
West African countries as well as to France.
A remaining concern is that the instrumental variable should
meet the exclusion restriction, which means that the distance
between a village and the harbour of Dakar should only be
correlated with loans through its effect on remittances.
However, since loans are a driver for investment, a lack of
access to credit markets can decrease the level of development
of a village which in turn will increase migration. Subsequently,
I rule out this source of bias by controlling for the village level
of development.
Findings
The OLS regression results show that the receipt of remittances
increases the likelihood of receiving a loan in a household. This
result is robust to the inclusion of household head and general
household characteristics, proxies for wealth and the occurrence
of shocks. In terms of magnitude, I found that the receipt of
remittances increases the likelihood of having a loan by 4.9
percentage points. After controlling for household fixed effects,
the findings show that the receipt of remittances increases the
probability of having a loan by 11.8 percentage points. Results
are also robust while using the instrumental variable approach –
this suggests that remittances can help expand households’
access to credit markets, rather than being used after the fact to
help repay loans.
The overall findings support a complementarity between
remittances and credit markets. A detailed analysis shows that
the results are mainly driven by loans for consumption reasons
and food, in particular, as well as loans provided through
informal channels such as family or relatives.
Policy implications
These results highlights the fact that family and close relatives
left-behind do not only depend on their migrants’ transfers to
fulfil their basic needs but also on credit markets. Consequently,
policy makers should put more efforts to alleviate extreme
poverty which will allow remittances to be invested in more
productive investments such as starting a business or
professional activities. Moreover, despite the availability of
other income such as remittances, credit markets still play an
important role and are not fully replaceable.
